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Abstract 
A rule-based regime of international trade is built upon 
norms of equality and non-discrimination. It helps 
maintain equity in international trade by the observance of 
principles such as that of Most Favoured Nation and 
National Treatment. A closer inspection of the sector wise 
international trade practices of nations suggests that there 
are deviations from the rule-based mechanism of World 
Trade Organisation. This detrimentally impacts the 
balance of trade. This research article analyses the 
application of the rule-based regime of the World Trade 
Organisation with special reference to instances of 
inequalities in regulations imposed on trade in food 
products in the context of India and other developing 
countries. The paper concludes with an analysis of the 
plausible reasons for the rejection of exports from 
developing countries and suggests the need for the 
rectification of such inequalities.  
Keywords: Equity, Most Favoured Nation, National Treatment, 
Non-Discrimination, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1. Introduction: Developing Countries’ Engagement with 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World 
Trade Organisation 
The participation of developing countries within the framework of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been lower 
than that of developed nations since its formation. During the time 
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of formation of GATT 1947, Asian and African nations were in the 
process of reconstructing their polity and economy, post the colonial 
rampage. Before the Uruguay rounds of negotiation, the functioning 
of the GATT was based upon the policy of major traders negotiating 
with principal suppliers. Since developing nations were neither 
major traders nor principal suppliers of commodities, they were 
excluded from world trade deliberations.1 The GATT was founded 
with twenty-three contracting parties,2 of which only ten were 
developing nations and the remaining thirteen signatories were 
developed economies.3 
From the 1960s, the GATT witnessed a substantial increase in terms 
of participation of developing nations. By the end of 1991, there were 
one hundred and two members in the GATT, of which seventy-nine 
were developing nations.4 Mechanisms such as Special and 
Differential Treatment (S&DT), Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) (Under this system, developed countries offer non-reciprocal 
preferential treatment to products originating in developing 
countries. Preference-giving countries unilaterally determine which 
countries and which products are included in their schemes), etc. 
were brought into force, whereby developing nations were given 
preferential treatment, thereby encouraging their participation. 
Though this offered a smooth entry into world trade, embedded 
protectionist tendencies manifested through political forces 
persisted. For instance, in the Tokyo Round, the United States and 
the European Communities insisted that they would not give the 
benefits of the newly drafted Codes, which contained S&DT 
provisions, to the developing countries unless they agreed to adhere 
to the GATT obligations once they turned richer. This stance of the 
leadership of the developed countries5 created political pressure to 
accede to the Codes. Similarly, though the GSP was put into practice 
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from 1970s, developed countries were not inclined to lift restrictions 
on most competitive products.6  
Amidst these happenings, developing countries, including India, 
maintained trade barriers with a view to protect their economy and 
nascent industries.7 However, debt crises, pressure from 
international lending systems and economic stagnation led many 
developing countries to slash their trade barriers and open up their 
economies, with the goal of liberalization.8 The Uruguay Round of 
negotiations appeared promising to developing countries, as it 
focused on sectors such as textiles, agriculture, etc. The Uruguay 
rounds culminated in the formation of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). GATT, 1947 was replaced by GATT 1994, it 
being one of the sub-agreements to WTO. 9 
While discussing the engagement of third world nations with the 
WTO, it is crucial to ascertain the trading predicament of the 
economically weak nations. Even after twenty-five years of its 
formation, African engagement in global trade is a meagre 2%.10 
“Total trade from Africa to the rest of the world averaged $760,463 
million in current prices in the period 2015 - 2017, compared with 
$481,081 million from Oceania, $4,109,131 million from Europe, 
$5,139,649 million from America and $6,801,474 million from 
Asia.”11 African nations are thus not yet completely aligned with the 
requisite economic transformation that is vital for enhancing 
prospects of global trade.12 Their existing economic pattern needs 
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reformulation, as a majority of African nations impose substantial 
tariff barriers in intra-regional trade, contrary to the WTO norms.13 
It is opined that Africa needs deeper integration that goes beyond 
just preferential tariff liberalization.14 
Fragile democracies, weak governance,15 expenses incurred for 
getting a matter adjudicated by the Dispute Settlement Body of 
WTO,16 etc. are factors that contribute to decreased third world 
engagement within the WTO framework. While legalisation 
decreases uncertainty, it imposes additional costs through increased 
complexity of procedures, making it difficult to avail benefits from 
the system.17 Developed countries, therefore, are more likely to use 
WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism to their advantage, than the 
developing countries.18 
History of the GATT and the WTO reveals that their dispute 
settlement mechanism have been optimally used by developed 
countries. In a study conducted in 2008, of the 380 cases that were 
considered by the WTO, only 18% of the complaints were brought 
for consideration before the WTO by developing countries. It was 
found that developed countries, that constitute a minority of the 
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WTO members, had initiated around 80% of the cases.19 Most 
developing countries do not have access to a high level of legal 
expertise and other human and technical resources, thereby 
increasing the cost of making use of the dispute settlement system.20 
Gregory Shaffer attributes this to constraints of legal knowledge, 
financial endowment, political power … or simply law, money and 
politics.21 In the context of the Uruguay Rounds, Nelson Mandela 
had pointed out that “the developing countries were not able to 
ensure that the rules accommodated their realities… it was mainly 
the preoccupations and problems of the advanced industrial 
economies that shaped the agreement.”22 Further, uniformly applied 
rules are not necessarily fair owing to the differing circumstances of 
the members.23 
At the same time, it is important to note that many nations that are 
economically stronger are keen on retaining their ‘developing 
nation’ tag.  This is because developing countries are entitled to 
S&DT under the WTO regime which helps them secure (i) longer 
time periods for implementing international agreements and 
commitments (ii) increased trading opportunities and (iii) the 
advantage of provisions requiring the WTO members to safeguard 
their trade interests, etc.24 Advanced economies like Qatar, Saudi 
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Arabia, Hong Kong, South Korea, etc. still consider themselves as 
developing nations.25 Developed States such as the United States and 
the European Union are of the opinion that countries such as India, 
China and South Africa must no longer fall under the ‘developing 
nation’ tag.26 Brazil’s forgoing of the developing nation status, 
though welcomed by developed nations, has set the ball rolling 
regarding the right of developing countries to S&DT provisions.27 
Despite the passage of two decades since the formation of the WTO, 
the successful integration of developing countries within the trading 
fabric cannot be conclusively determined. Instability of national 
economies, infrastructural hardships, lack of expertise, procedural 
formalities of trade, oversized populations, etc. hinder attaining 
sufficient progress in trade and securing optimum representation 
before WTO.  
1.2 Scheme of Research  
The WTO, constituted upon the edifice of the GATT, focuses on 
liberalising trade through better market access, affordability of better 
standards of living and the economic development of nations across 
the globe. The six featured objectives of the WTO are (i) to set and 
enforce rules for international trade, (ii) to provide a forum for 
negotiating and monitoring further trade liberalization, (iii) to 
resolve trade disputes, (iv) to increase transparency of decision-
making processes, (v) to cooperate with other major international 
economic institutions involved in global economic management, 
and (vi) to help developing countries benefit fully from the global 
trading system.28 
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This research examines the objective of the WTO to ensure that 
developing countries benefit from global trade in association with its 
objective to set up and enforce rules of international trade that 
encapsulates the ideal of WTO as far as developing nations are 
concerned. The article discusses equity as practiced in international 
trade and its practical manifestations. The author evaluates the rule-
based mechanism of the WTO with special reference to India in the 
context of food and agricultural sector, vis-à-vis sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures.  
2. Equity in Trade and Rule Based Mechanism of WTO 
The one-line connotation given to any trading arrangement is that 
let ‘trade be free and fair.’29 While freedom of trade is dependent 
upon success of diplomacy and politics, fairness/equity of trade is 
largely premised upon adherence to a legal scheme. Freedom of 
trade without fairness can have far-reaching consequences. The 
history of third world countries is an account of incidents where 
fairness in trade was overpowered by the military might and 
technological advancements of the colonizers.30 Therefore, what is 
being sought for is a better guarantee for trade performance in 
accordance with fairness principles. This section focusses on the 
legal system of WTO in order to understand equity in trade. 
Terms such as ‘equity,’ ‘non arbitrariness,’ etc. are the equivalents of 
fairness in international law scholarship. They are embedded in 
doctrines of public international law such as the Calvo clause (which 
entails equality of treatment to foreign entities/nationals)31, 
principle of non-refoulement (according to which, no one shall be 
made to return to a country where they may face danger, inhuman 
or degrading treatment on account of reasons such as violation of 
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law, ethnicity, etc.),32 etc. Nonetheless, the persuasive nature of 
international law provides space for dissensions. For instance, 
despite receiving stern international criticism for its refusal to grant 
entry to North Korean refugees based on principle of non-
refoulement, the Chinese political stance on the matter has remained 
unchanged.33  
The rule-based system of international trade has to be ascertained 
against the backdrop of the implementation mechanisms available 
under the WTO regime. For example, referring a case to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the Dispute Settlement Body of 
the WTO makes their findings binding upon the parties. Even after 
a matter is referred to dispute settlement mechanisms, many a times 
countries withdraw the case based upon consensus, with the hope 
that the subject of consensus will prevail.34 However, when countries 
resort to pacific methods of dispute settlement such as negotiation 
or mediation, its implementation is solely based upon the political 
will of the parties.35 The WTO, coupled with its Dispute Settlement 
Understanding offers mechanisms to effectuate an equitable/rule-
based regime. ‘Whether these mechanisms serve their purpose’ is the 
fundamental premise of this research. ‘Are these mechanisms 
beneficial to developing countries?’ forms the second query.  
Kofi Annan once expressed, “We cannot take the onward march of 
free trade and rule of law for granted. Instead, we must resolve to 
underpin the free global market with genuinely global values and 
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secure it with effective institutions.”36 Rule of law in trade/ rule-
based regime of trade is understood in the context of parameters of 
human rights, democracy, legal regulatory efficiency, transparency 
and the like.37 Friedrich Hayek construed the rule of law as the ‘heart 
of development policy’38 and E.P. Thomson, the Marxist historian, 
referred to it as an ‘unqualified human good’39 According to Neil 
Mac Cormick, rule of law is 
stance in legal politics according to which matters of legal 
regulation or controversy ought to, as far as possible, be 
conducted in accordance with predetermined rules of 
considerable generality and clarity in which legal relations 
comprise rights, duties, powers and immunities, clearly defined 
by reference to such rules, and in which acts of the government 
however desirable, teleologically must be subordinated to 
respect for such rules and rights.40  
Absence of a rule-based regime can lead to discrimination and in 
turn oppression. Cordell Hull regarded discrimination as the 
handmaiden for armed aggression.41 His undersecretary, Sumner 
Welles, voiced that “one of the surest safeguards against war is the 
opportunity of all peoples to buy and sell on equal terms.”42 In the 
specific context of the WTO texts, rule of law in trade is directly 
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connected to principles of equality and non-discrimination as 
envisaged under Most Favoured Nation treatment and National 
Treatment as both norms quintessentially convey these principles.  
Discrimination not only upsets the rule-based regime of 
international trade, but also causes distrust among trading partners. 
When discrimination is sought through tariff and non-tariff 
measures, it imposes costs on foreign trading partners. It does not 
bring an economic advantage to importing nations either, as such 
measures are often imposed in pursuance of a hideous agenda. This 
causes deadweight losses to the economy.43 Trade disruption caused 
due to the imposition of non-tariff measures by a trading partner is 
countered by other trading nations taking similar methods. This 
leads to manipulation in trade such as citing a third country with 
respect to rules of origin,44 over- production of goods resulting in 
dumping,45 purposeful devaluation of currency46 etc.  
2.1 The Dual Principles of Most Favoured Nation and National 
Treatment 
The rule-based regime of international trade is reflected in Article I 
and III of the GATT Agreement. Article I is the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) principle and Article III deals with National 
Treatment (NT). These dual principles are embedded in other 
fundamental texts of the WTO such as General Agreement on Trade 
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in Services (GATS)47 and Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).48 
The MFN and NT principles are the means by which the pivotal 
policies of equality and non-discrimination under the WTO regime 
are upheld. MFN mandates that goods imported by foreign 
countries be treated equally.  Under the WTO agreements, countries 
cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners; 
accordingly, if one country is granted a special favour (such as a 
lower customs duty rate for one of their products), it must be made 
available to all.49 MFN makes it obligatory for countries to afford no 
better treatment to similar products from different countries.  
While the MFN ensures equal treatment for similar goods at the 
borders, the NT focusses upon like treatment behind the borders. NT 
is founded on the principle of treating foreign and domestic goods 
equally.50 Premised upon tolerance to imports and domestic 
products of like nature, it offers competition between rivalling goods 
by mandating their like treatment under international trade law. NT 
principles are more impactful as its efficacy is tested upon national 
policies and regulations, which form the subject of contentious 
disputes before the WTO.. The principle of NT is founded upon two 
objectives. (i) ensuring that nations do not circumvent their tariff 
reduction commitments by enacting discriminatory taxes or internal 
laws against those items that have complied with customs 
regulations of a particular country 51 and (ii) avoidance of 
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protectionism in the application of internal taxes and regulatory 
measures.52 The second objective is broader in nature as 
protectionism can be practiced in various forms. Legitimate 
exceptions to MFN and NT norms are permissible under the WTO 
system. 
MFN and NT principles are often discussed in the context of 
disputes questioning trade restrictive measures adopted by 
countries against each other. Majority of the discussions revolve 
around NT rather than on MFN. While analysing a complaint 
brought before it, GATT/ WTO panels determine whether the 
importing country has overtly/ implicitly discriminated between 
two like products (of which one is domestically manufactured). This 
interpretation grew more intrusive over the years through analysis 
of observable characteristics of goods such as their physical 
similarities, competitiveness, substitutability of the products, criteria 
used in tariff classification etc.53 
The Japan-Alcoholic Beverages case is one that dealt extensively with 
the application of the principle of national treatment.54 The 
complainants in the case, namely, European Communities, Canada 
and United States claimed that spirits exported to Japan were 
discriminated against, since Japan imposes substantially lower tariff 
on its exotic drink sochu when compared to whisky, cognac and 
white spirits.55 The WTO Panel found that the Japanese Liquor Tax 
law was violative of Article III.2 of GATT, against which Japan 
preferred an appeal before the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body 
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held that members of the WTO are free to pursue their own domestic 
goals through internal taxation or regulation so long as they do not 
do so in a way that violates Article III or any of the other 
commitments which they have made in the WTO Agreement. The 
Appellate Body affirmed the panel’s conclusion though it stated that 
errors have come in the legal reasoning provided by the panel. An 
internal tax measure needs determination on two counts (i)whether 
the imported and domestic products are taxed alike (ii) whether the 
taxes applied to imported products are in excess of that applied to 
like products. The Appellate Body also confirmed three issues with 
regard to which NT has to be determined. They are (i) whether 
imported and domestic products are directly competitive or 
substitutable products; (ii) whether the directly competitive or 
substitutable imported and domestic products are similarly taxed; 
and (iii) whether dissimilar taxation of the directly competitive or 
substitutable imported and domestic products is applied so as to 
afford protection to domestic production.56 These factors have a 
bearing on determining protectionism vis-à-vis national treatment, 
regardless of the sector of study. 
3. Trade Restrictive Measures vis-à-vis Developing Nations 
Studies indicate that despite the progressive implementation of 
equality norms, nations are devising new methods to pursue 
protectionism. The two decades since the formation of the WTO has 
witnessed an upsurge in trade restrictive measures. These include 
both tariff and non-tariff barriers. Director General of WTO, Robert 
Azevedo, in the context of the accentuation of trade barriers between 
October 2018 and May 2019 stated that, “the message of the report 
before us is very serious. These actions have real economic 
effects…It is essential that we tackle the tensions that are leading to 
higher trade barriers, greater uncertainty and lower trade growth.”57 
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The trade policy review with respect to the abovementioned period, 
placed trade covered by import restrictive measures at USD 339.5 
billion, with the imposition of thirty-eight import restrictive 
measures including tariff increases, import bans, special safeguards, 
import taxes and export duties. The same period also witnessed the 
implementation of forty-seven new measures aimed at trade 
facilitation, with almost seven new measures adopted every month. 
It also needs to be noted that trade restrictive measures recorded 
during this period was regarded the lowest average since 2012.58 The 
report also indicates that a majority of these measures have been 
imposed by G20 nations comprising developed and dominant 
developing countries like India. 
Reasons for the spike in trade restrictive measures may vary. They 
include the need to protect domestic manufacturers, safeguards 
against dumping, ensuring public health and safety, etc. The 
explanations provided to justify the imposition of such restrictions 
are often superficial; the underlying purpose being to defeat healthy 
competition between like products. However, such exercises may 
not be advantageous at all times. For example, in the case of Mexico 
which levied punitive tariffs of 1,105% on Chinese footwear59 as anti-
dumping duty, through a superficial examination of injury to the 
domestic market and the non-market economy treatment afforded 
to China.60 The Mexican measures resulted in an unprecedented 
diversion of exports to Mexico by China; as a consequence of which, 
trade went from USD 400 million in 1993 to USD 30,000 million in 
2007.61 This is an example of how the rule-based regime wanes in the 
midst of economic strategies. 
Deterrence to trade is the antithesis to the equality and non-
discrimination principles, unless they fall within valid exceptions 
under the WTO framework. Nations tend to justify import 
restrictions under the guise of protecting public health, morals, 
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preserving environment, preventing untoward practices in trade, 
etc.62 While they are legitimate exceptions to GATT and its sub-
agreements, closer inspection of individual situations prove that, at 
times, these exceptions are relied upon to pursue the protectionist 
policies of governments. The non-discrimination philosophy of the 
WTO needs to be examined in the context of practical realities for a 
better analysis of the situation. This examination is conducted with 
reference to restrictions imposed on food exports from India under 
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures.  
3.1 Global Food Exports 
The Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) sets out the basic rules of food safety and allows 
countries to set their own standards to the extent requisite for the 
protection of human, plant and animal life and health.63 The SPS 
Agreement permits countries to impose measures to protect plant, 
animal and human life and health in a manner that is not arbitrary 
or unjustifiably discriminatory between countries where identical or 
similar conditions prevail. Risk assessment with respect to imports 
should be based on scientific justification backed by scientific 
evidence.64 The adequate level of SPS protection, is one that is not 
more trade restrictive than necessary with due regard to economic 
and technical feasibility.65 Wherever international standards exist, 
harmonization shall be based upon widely accepted yardsticks such 
as Codex Alimentarius Commission,66 International Office of 
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Epizootics (OIE),67 International Plant Protection Convention,68 etc. 
Members to the WTO are at liberty to maintain higher levels of 
protection than the current international standards, if there is 
scientific justification or the same is deemed appropriate by the 
member based on Article 5 of the Agreement. Members are 
encouraged to enter into equivalence agreements (Article 3), provide 
requisite technical assistance to developing countries (Article 9) and 
also to provide special and differential treatment to them (Article 
10).69 
The European Union,70 United States71, etc. have their own stringent 
regimes of food safety, higher than what is maintained by Codex. 
The prominent food safety standards relate to maximum residue 
levels, hygiene in food processing units, cases of infestations, etc. 
Research shows, with regard to pesticide residue levels, Codex 
accounts for around 2,500 maximum residue levels, whereas the EU 
has over 22,000, the United States over 8,600, Japan has over 9,000 
whereas China in comparison has only 484.72 This divide, to a large 
extent, is attributable to the policies of the respective nations with 
regard to implementation of food safety norms.  
A study conducted on the reasons for differing food safety and 
quality standards in countries of the European Union, Mercosur (the 
Spanish acronym of Mercado Común del Sur. It is a political and 
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economic bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
and Venezuela) and African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) Regions 
explains that the difference in priority maintained by countries is a 
reason for differences in the application of food safety standards. EU 
countries generally practice Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) and 
Good Health Practices (GHP).73 Mercosur nations are export 
oriented economies and therefore practice GAP/ GHP or like 
practices to a very large extent, whereas only very few firms among 
ACP countries practice GAP/GHP standards. While the EU regions 
emphasize on consumer-related topics such as traceability and 
labelling systems,74 unequal income divisions in Mercosur nations 
drive people to emphasize more on home markets. Governments 
and producers of Mercosur nations are becoming more aware of 
food safety and quality regulations. ACP countries are still 
discovering the need for food quality and safe food. Governments 
play a major role in developing countries by providing necessary 
infrastructure, better facilities for transportation and storage in order 
to conform with the international food safety standards.75 These 
nations also need better support from WHO and Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in the form of technical assistance. 
Better food safety management can improve international 
competitiveness and quality of life globally. 
3.2 Instances of Discrimination in Global Food Trade with respect 
to India 
While most food safety directives are oriented at ensuring the 
availability of safe food, this is not the case in all situations. Due to 
the reduction in import tariffs and commitments based on principles 
such as S&DT, afforded to developing countries, high income 
countries increasingly make use of quality standards as formidable 
barriers to trade.76 For instance, despite being the largest milk 
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producer in the world, India is unable to export milk products to the 
EU.77 Issues raised by the EU against entry of Indian dairy products 
include lack of traceability of products to farms of origin, high risk 
status of India as regards foot and mouth disease, issues related to 
milk product quality controls, residues monitoring controls, hygiene 
in producing centres, milking hygiene, presence of chemicals in 
some of the cattle feed posing a threat to the milk quality, etc.78 The 
EU raised these issues despite export certification being mandatory 
in the Indian dairy sector, along with the condition that exports will 
take place only from the materials processed in an approved units 
that implementing food safety management systems.79 Despite being 
made in accordance with Food Safety Management System Based 
Certification,80 Indian dairy products are not accepted by the EU. 
India has grown to become a strong competitor to the EU in milk 
production and this can be one of the overt reasons for EU’s stance 
in this regard.81 It is quite ironical that the EU seeks to import milk 
products to India without reciprocating the same.82 
Another instance of discrimination is with regard to Indian 
mangoes. Studies indicate that mangoes from Pakistan are 3.5 times 
more prone to pest infestations when compared to mangoes from 
India.83 However, in 2014, a complete ban was imposed on import of 
Indian mangoes, whereas no such ban was imposed on products 
from Pakistan.84 Similar measures should have been imposed 
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against the Dominican Republic and Kenya where similar conditions 
of fruit flies’ infestations exist, however, they were not visited with 
the same regulations as India was.85 This is a sign of the non-
transparent nature of the regime of the EU and is a violation of its 
WTO obligations.86 
Yet another case is one dealing with discrimination against Indian 
tea exports. Trade levels of major tea exporting countries like India 
and China are often reduced on account of high pesticide residue 
levels. For example, Germany had alleged high residue levels of 
ethion in Darjeeling tea; and high levels of bicofols in Assam, Terai 
and Dooars Tea. When Germany rejected the tea consignments, 
similar exports were accepted in U.K. leading to the question as to 
whether Germany practiced the same based on protectionist 
intents.87 
Likewise, the EU had banned Indian marine products on SPS 
grounds in 1997. Despite India acclimatising its system to the EU 
regime and incurring substantial investments in infrastructure, 
equipment, running costs, training of personnel at various stages of 
production and processing, etc, in 2006, the EU rejected the Indian 
marine consignments containing antibiotics and bacterial 
inhibitors.88 There are around 250 bacterial inhibitors among which 
only 10 are banned. 89However, the EU filed complaints based upon 
presence of any of these 250 inhibitors, even though they were not 
specifically banned.90 Different EU members offered different 
reasons for rejection of similar consignments. It was alleged that high 
yield from the Mediterranean seas, leading to a drop in prices for 
marine products for EU members like Italy and Spain coincided with 
the rejection of Indian marine products, suggesting that restrictions 
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were imposed on Indian exports with a view to limit the exports on 
purpose.91 
3.3 Plausible Reasons for Exports Rejection on SPS Grounds 
Reasons for the protectionist use of the SPS Agreement are multi-
pronged. One among them is the interpretation offered to ‘risk 
assessment’ and ‘scientific evidence’ by the WTO. In Japan – 
Agricultural Products II,92 it was held that there is no need for a 
rational or objective relationship between scientific evidence and 
SPS measures. Risk assessment as defined in the SPS Agreement 
reads as given below:  
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or 
spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing 
Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
which might be applied, and of the associated potential 
biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the 
potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising 
from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.93 
The Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon94 observed that the 
evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a 
pest or disease or evaluation of the potential for adverse effects can 
be done either qualitatively or quantitatively. Further, there is no 
need for risk assessment to establish a certain magnitude or 
threshold level of degree of risk. As far as the second aspect of the 
definition is concerned, only the ‘potential’ for adverse effects on 
human or animal health arising from additives need to be evaluated. 
The Appellate Body in EC - Hormones95 confirmed the finding in 
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Salmon and held that there is no requirement to establish a minimum 
magnitude or threshold of risk.96 This sense of logic employed by the 
WTO, based on a literal interpretation of the texts, has made it easier 
for nations to employ SPS measures.  
Coupled with the above-mentioned, deficient communication 
between governments and exporters, lack of infrastructure and 
expertise in country of export, inadequate storage and 
transportation facilities, absence of synergized efforts by national 
agencies to constantly monitor adherence to quality standards, 
insistence on overly technical standards, complicated and constantly 
changing food safety standards endorsed in different jurisdictions, 
etc. pose challenges to Indian exporters.  
Developed nations’ susceptiveness to lobbying by supermarket 
chains, reliance on over-complicated and technical standards, 
agenda to avoid strong competitors in desired sectors, priority given 
to consumer choices are some of the reasons behind imposition of 
excruciating SPS standards.97 Developed nations also fail to honour 
the doctrine of equivalence tests by conducting test already done in 
developing countries for checking food safety thus incurring huge 
expenses. 98For example, Indian exports to EU are already proved to 
be in compliance with global GAPs and are made to repeat their tests 
in EU. While laboratory tests are cost Rs. 8000 – 9000, these tests are 
repeated in EU for Rs.40,000 – 50,000.99 This creates huge additional 
expenses for Indian exporters and deters free trade. 
4. Conclusion 
The research showcases that India’s agriculture and food exports are 
subjected to inequitable treatment at times on superficial grounds. 
While discriminatory treatment on grounds of protection of human, 
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plant and animal health can be justified, discrimination afforded on 
superficial grounds are violative of principles of NT. Such violations 
of NT obligations point towards the inequity persisting in trade. 
Though summarized in the context of Indian food exports in this 
article, the situation is not uncommon in connection to other 
developing countries as well. At the same time, developed countries 
also have similar grievances against developing countries, including 
India. The main premise in the case of India – Agricultural Products100 
is one such an instance. 
It is important to incorporate necessary rectification in cases where 
tradable items are rejected by the importing country for substantial 
reasons. At the same time, misuse of the provisions for permeating 
protectionism cannot be overlooked. It is important that developing 
countries stay prepared to face tough negotiations in cases where 
rejections are made on superficial grounds. Only then can trade 
entail a win-win situation for the parties involved.  
The inequity in food trade also exposes instances of the distribution 
of unsafe food among citizens. Masses in developing countries are 
exposed to unsafe food and water because of improper governance, 
lack of adequate facilities with respect to maintenance of food 
quality standards and lack of awareness. Lack of access to safe food 
and drinking water has resulted in an increasing number of deaths 
in third world countries. “Until the domestic market become non-
receptive to bad quality produce and strict emphasis is placed on 
consumer health and food safety standards, India cannot be an 
exporter of vegetables despite its large production base.”101 The 
ordinary citizenry needs to be sensitized to maintain zero-tolerance 
to unsafe food and the global community is bound to come together 
to make safe and quality food affordable across the globe. 
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